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COMMENT
GAINING ADMISSION TO LOW-RENT
PUBLIC HOUSING
MICHAEL J. DALE*
I. INTRODUCTION
Gaining admission to low rent public housing' has become a com-
plex, dehumanizing, and, more often than not, unsuccessful endeavor?
A major cause of this difficulty is clearly a lack of adequate housing
in both the public and private sectors of our society.' However, even
when housing is available, applicants must overcome the procedural
obstacles raised by confusing and complex admissions criteria.
There are few sources of information available to prospective
applicants.4 Yet, without such aids, these persons generally are not in
a position to comprehend the maze of federal and state statutory re-
quirements for admission; ° nor can they be expected to be aware of
or to understand the appropriate case law. Because so little information
of an explanatory nature is available, an applicant must generally
consult an attorney. Unfortunately, many attorneys are also unaware
of current statutes, cases and practices concerning admission to public
housing.° This article will attempt to answer some of the questions
* A.B., Colgate 'University, 1967; J.D., Boston College Law School, 1970; Staff At-
torney, Legal Aid Society of Westchester County (New York).
1 42 U.S.C. g 1402(1) (1970) provides, in part:
The term "low-rent housing" means decent, safe and sanitary dwellings
within the financial reach of families of low income, and developed and admin-
istered to promote serviceability, efficiency, economy, and stability, and embraces
all necessary appurtenances thereto. The dwellings in low-rent housing shall be
available solely for families of low income.
2 See M. Rosen, Tenant's Rights in Public Housing, Project on Social Welfare Law,
at 24-25, 31 (1967) (unpublished paper in N.Y.U. School of Law Library).
$ See Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (1968).
4 One example of the few informational guides that are available is the "Philadelphia
Handbook on Tenants' Rights," prepared by community leaders and Iegal services attorneys
in that city. However, the pamphlet, as effective as it is, does not provide extensive
analysis of the application procedure for public housing.
5 Little literature is available from state- or federally-financed housing authorities.
The Department of Housing and Urban Development has not followed the pattern set by
state and federal welfare authorities who have produced "how to" pamphlets in areas such
as Medicaid. Federally-funded local housing authorities are, however, required to post
their "Rules and Regulations for Admission" in a "conspicuous" place in their office,
according to the HUD Low-Rent Housing Income Limits, Rents, and Occupancy Hand-
book—RHA 7465.1 11 5 (issued June, 1969) (hereinafter cited as HUD Handbook, RHA).
Unfortunately, this is rarely done.
Public housing applicants usually deal with legal services attorneys or lay advocates,
rather than with private practitioners. Paraprofessionals in "poverty law" such as com-
munity organizers, VISTA volunteers and community action agency personnel provide an
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that arise in this area of the law.7 Specifically, it will analyze those
factors which have a direct bearing on an applicant's success in gain-
ing admission: (1) admission standards based on income, residency,
desirability and discrimination; and (2) management practices and
the applicant's right to a hearing. 8
II. ADMISSION STANDARDS
Admission standards for public housing derive from either federal
or state statutes. The United States Housing Act of 1937 0 is the
enabling statute from which all federal standards emanate. It also
serves as the basis for the structure of all the federal housing author-
ities which administer federally-funded housing projects. State stan-
dards arise from similar enabling legislation. The New York and
Massachusetts public housing laws, chosen for analysis here, are
representative of most state laws as regards admission standards. Both
clearly reveal the threshold problems encountered by applicants for
low-income housing. The New York law, despite the specificity of its
language, has been the subject of extensive litigation." On the other
hand, the Massachusetts statute, 11
 which is less clear, has been the
subject of no litigation with reference to its admission standards.
A. Federal Standards
Within the entire scheme of federal legislation, there is no precise
statement of admission standards for low-rent public housing." Ap-
alternative mode of practical assistance. Perhaps the most successful example of parapro-
fessional activity, as viewed by those receiving the maistance, is in the area of welfare
rights.
7
 For a discussion of the moral and philosophical responsibility for housing people,
a topic not treated in this article, see Michelman, The Advent of a Right to Housing:
A Current Appraisal, 5 Harv. Civ. Rights-Civ. Lib. L. Rev. 207 (1970).
8 For discussions of other problems in the area of low-rent housing, see Comment,
The Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968: Private Enterprise and Low-Income
Housing, 10 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 936 (1969) (discussing the planning and building of
public housing) ; Report of the National Commission on Urban Problems to the Congress
and to the President of the United States, U.S. Government Printing Office (1968)
(concerning cost and efficiency of public housing); Gribetz and Grad, Housing Code
Enforcement: Sanctions and Remedies, 66 Colum. L. Rev. 1254 (1966) (concerning codes,
evictions and leases); and Comment, Public Landlords and Private Tenants: The Eviction
of "Undesirables" from Public Housing Projects, 77 Yale L.J. 988 (1968).
9
 42 U.S.C. §§ 1401 et seq. (1970).
18 N.Y. Public Housing Law § 1 et seq. (McKinney, 1955), as amended, (Supp.
1970) ; see Escalera v. New York City Housing Authority, 425 F.2d 853 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 853 (1970). Doubtless, part of the reason why so much litigation has
taken place in New York is the presence of the New York City Housing Authority, which
receives its financing from federal, state and municipal sources and which operates the
nation's largest housing program involving over 144,000 families.
11 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 121B, § 32 (Supp. 1971).
12 42 U.S.C.1) 1410(g) (2) (1970) states that:
the public housing agency shall adopt and promulgate regulations establishing,
36
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parently, the only requirement is that applicants be "families of low
income." 13 Nothing within the statute elucidates or amplifies that
phrase.
While the Housing Act is perhaps necessarily vague, one might
expect that the public housing regulations of the Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD), which administers federal
housing policies, would provide more specific standards. HUD has
set out its guidelines in what is known as the HUD Unified Issuances
System." Unfortunately, these guidelines do little more than reiterate
the language found in the federal statute. For example, in the Low-
Rent Administration of Program Handbook, a section within the
Unified Issuances System, there appears a requirement that there be
posted and distributed statements that low-rent housing is provided on
a non-discriminatory basis. Although this requirement makes the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 applicable to federally-financed low-rent
public housing, it is devoid of a definition concerning admissibility.''
All the prospective applicant learns from such a statement is that
there is to be no discrimination. Without a definition of admissibility,
the regulation lacks force and the prospective applicant cannot know
whether he has grounds to challenge a denial of admission.
A second reference to admission is found within the Unified
Issuances System in the Low-Rent Housing Income Limits, Rents,
and Occupancy Handbook:
The Local Authority shall formally adopt and promulgate,
by publication or posting in a conspicuous place for examina-
tion by prospective tenants, regulations establishing its ad-
missions policies, and all revisions thereof. Such regulations
must be reasonable and must give full consideration to the
Local Authority's public responsibility for rehousing dis-
placed families; to the applicant's status as a serviceman or
admission policies which shall give full consideration to its responsibility for the
rehousing of displaced families, to the applicant's status as a serviceman or veteran
or relationship to a serviceman or veteran or to a disabled serviceman or veteran,
and to the applicant's age or disability, housing conditions, urgency of housing
need and source of income: Provided, That in establishing such admission policies
the public housing agency shall accord to families of low income such priority
over single persons as it determines to be necessary to avoid undue hardship.
Thus, it is evident that the agencies exercise considerable discretion in implementing the
few existing statutory guidelines.
16 42 U.S.C. § 1402(1) (1970).
14 The complete name is the HUD Unified Issuances System of Low Rent Housing
Handbooks. As of June, 1969, HUD revised its system for the promulgation of policies,
procedures, and instructions, so as to include almost everything within this unified system.
A document cited in the past as the Low Rent Management Manual has been incorporated
into the unified system as one of the several handbooks. In addition to handbooks, the
system, includes guides, circulars and notices.
15 HUD Handbook, RHA 7401.1 ch. 9, § 1, appendix 1, 2, g.
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a veteran or relationship to a serviceman or veteran or to a
disabled serviceman or veteran; and to the applicant's age or
disability, housing conditions, urgency of housing need, and
source of income; and shall accord to families consisting of
two or more persons such priority over families consisting
of single persons as the Local Authority determines to be
necessary to avoid undue hardship."
Again, the provision makes no detailed explanation of admission
policies. It merely notes, in a statement taken almost verbatim from
the National Housing Act," that certain preferences must be recog-
nized.
The third and final reference in the HUD regulations is found in
the "Annual Contributions Contract," the document of agreement
between HUD and the local housing authority (LHA). The state-
ment found therein is precisely the same as that found in the Low-
Rent Housing Limits, Rents, and Occupancy Handbook. 18 Thus, there
is a lack of both substantive federal legislation and explanatory regula-
tions to guide applicants and attorneys in the litigation of issues.
Resort, therefore, must usually be made to the constitutional princi-
ples of due process and equal protection of the law in determining
whether actual regulations truly conform to the purposes of the
enabling legislation.
B. State Standards
The New York law parallels the federal law in that it also has
an enabling statute and an agency-enacted set of rules and regulations.
The Public Housing Law, which governs operations of the housing
authorities in New York State, provides with regard to admissions
only that prospective tenants be "families of low income.'"° As with
the federal statute, it articulates no other standards. However, Title
9-C of the Official Compilation, Codes, Rules and Regulations of the
State of New York2° (hereinafter referred to as Title 9-C NYCRR)
does provide admission criteria and procedures for processing applica-
tions for low-rent housing. The pertinent section of Title 9-C NYCRR
is approximately twenty-three pages in length and describes in detail
the application procedure, commencing with the submission of a
16 Id. at 7465.1, If 5, Admission Policy.
17 42 U.S.C. I410(g) (2) (1970). Compare with the language cited in note 12 supra.
18 Consolidated Annual Contributions Contract, issued by Department of Housing
and Urban Development HUD-53011 (November, 1969).
le N.Y. Public Housing Law 156 (McKinney, Supp. 1970).
20 Official Compilation Codes, Rules and Regulations of the State of New York, Title
9-C, H 1627-1 et seq., as authorized by N.Y. Public Housing Law H 14, 19 (Mailnney,
1955), as amended, (Supp. 1970) (hereinafter cited as NYCRR).
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"Preliminary Application for Apartment" by the applicant and con-
cluding with notification to the prospective tenant "upon availability
of apartment."2t It also outlines several admission standards in depth,
although not precisely enough to avoid a substantial amount of litiga-
tion over their meaning.' Despite this shortcoming, the New York
law is somewhat more specific than the HUD Unified Issuances
System with regard to admission standards.
Massachusetts, which recently updated its public housing law,
has an expansive enabling statute, but lacks a body of rules and
regulations like those of New York and the federal government. The
Massachusetts law contains an admission procedure and standards of
eligibility for public housing which are more extensive than its federal
counterpart but less so than the New York law." This difference
among the three jurisdictions with regard to kind and degree of
eligibility standards becomes more apparent upon examination of the
relevant criteria.
C. Income Requirements
The only federal standard," and the primary state standard, to
determine eligibility for admission to low-rent housing is "level of
income." Under federal law, both the specific income level to be used
and its method of determination have been left to the local authority:
"the public housing agency shall determine, and so certify to the
[local] Authority, that each family in the project was admitted in
accordance with duly adopted regulations and approved income
limits . . .725 This statement appears in the Annual Contributions
Contract, which by its terms leaves both the criteria for adoption of
income levels and the means for determining the income of the
applicant wholly within the discretion of the LHA.28
 It does not ap-
pear that local housing authorities abuse this discretion. They tend,
21 Id. § 1627-1.1(a) and (j).
22 See Manigo v. New York City Housing Authority, 51 Misc. 2d 829, 273 N.Y.S.2d
1003 (Sup. Ct. 1966), aff'd mem., 27 App. Div. 2d 803, 279 N.Y.S.2d 1014, cert, denied,
389 U.S. 1008 (1967) (issue of desirability and criminal record); Complaint, Pry v. Port
Chester Housing Authority, Civil No. 71-1708 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (issue of desirability and
applicant's failure to obtain divorce decree).
25 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 121B, § 32 (Supp. 1971).
24 42 U.S.C. 1402.1 (1970).
25 42 U.S.C. 1410(g)(3) (1970).
20 HUD Handbook, RHA 7465.1 fr 2, General Requirements for Income Limits and
Rents. The Handbook states:
(a) Income limits designed to limit occupancy to families of low income, and
rents within the financial reach of such families, shall be fixed by the Local
Authority and approved by HAO after taking into consideration: (1) the family
size, composition, age, physical handicaps, and other factors which might affect
the rent-paying ability of the family, and (2) the economic factors which affect
the financial stability and solvency of the project.
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at least in the case of LHA's in New York and Massachusetts, to
simply adopt the state income regulations. Nonetheless, they could
adopt their own formulae without violating their federal contract.
State law does not always leave the income determination solely
in the hands of the LHA. The New York law, for example, while
giving abundant discretion to the local authorities, states:
The dwellings in the project shall be available solely for
persons or families of low income whose probable aggregate
annual income during the period of occupancy does not
exceed six times the rental (including the value or cost to
them of heat, light, water and cooking fuel) of the dwellings
to be furnished such persons or families . . . 27
Under the New York statute, within certain specified limits, the LHA
may modify the income schedules as, for example, in the case of
veterans and welfare recipients." In addition, the determination and
control of the rental cost for an apartment remain in the discretion
of the LHA, subject only to the statutory ceiling noted and the
contract between the LHA and the state.' The method for determin-
ing level of income is outlined in Title 9-C NYCRR, and the resulting
dollar figure is referred to as "aggregate annual income." 30
 The
computation procedure is extensive: income is broken down into
fixed and nonfixed income, and provisions are made for such wide-
ranging factors as tips for taxicab drivers and Christmas bonuses."
While not as detailed in its income determination procedure as
the New York law, the Massachusetts statute is still extensive in this
regard. It states that an authority
shall not accept as a tenant any person or persons whose net
annual income at the time of admission, less an exemption of
one hundred dollars for each minor member of the family
other than the head of the family and his spouse, exceeds
five times the annual rental, including the value or cost to
them of water, electricity, gas, other heating and cooking
fuels and other utilities, of the dwellings to be furnished
such person or persons.82
27 N.Y. Public Housing Law, I 156(1)(a) (McKinney, Supp. 1970).
28 Id. § 156(1)-(6) ; NYCRR §§ 1627-5.1(1) and 1627-2.6(c) (5).
se New York City Housing Authority v. Stern, 3 Misc. 2d 1007, 159 N.Y.S.2d 500
(Sup. Ct. 1956) ; N.Y. Public Housing Law 154 (McKinney, 1955) ; NYCRR I 1627-
5.1(b) (1), (2).
8° NYCRR § 1627-2.1 et seq.
81 Id. § 1627-2.6(b) and (e). For example, the value of tips and other considerations
will be induded in income. Taxicab drivers are assessed at 45% of commissions. NYCRR
also contains a procedure for verifying income, § 1627-2.6 (c) (2) (i).
as Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 121B, 32(c) (Supp. 1971).
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The statutes differ in two ways. First, the Massachusetts law leaves
less discretion to the LHA in computing an applicant's income. Local
housing authorities in Massachusetts may not manipulate income
schedules so as to alter income-rent proportions" as may be done
in New York. Second, the Massachusetts statute, unlike that of New
York, fails to provide a description of the manner in which the local
authorities should determine a prospective tenant's income. However,
as in New York, determination and control of the rental charge for an
apartment is left to the discretion of the local authority."
Although there are few reported cases and even fewer articles
concerning income determination, it would be unwise to conclude that
this criteria is not a problematic admission standard. At least two
other factors are probably more responsible for this lack of discussion
and litigation. Applicants who are denied admission because of "over
income," when confronted with the extensive income determination
system, are likely to accept the agency's computation without question.
Furthermore, since federal and state laws in New York and Massachu-
setts require extensive documentation of income determinations for
admission to public housing, it may be that authorities disregard in-
come levels as an admission criterion and resort to alternatve standards
to justify denial of admission.
Despite the difficulties of computation and documentation that
have been alluded to, it appears that the three statutes analyzed seem
adequate to prevent manipulation by local housing authorities. In
general, income is a comparatively objective standard which, unlike
the residency requirement, is well suited as a criterion for determining
admission eligibility.
D. Residency Requirements
As is the case with income, local residency is a frequently
utilized standard for admission to public housing. It is not difficult for
local authorities to find out how long an applicant has been living
in a city. The LHA may check voter registration, school enrollment,
public assistance records or rent receipts. On the surface, the purposes
of a residency requirement appear to be valid. The arguments in favor
of residency requirements are that they allow a community to care
for its own low-income families, discourage outsiders from migrating
to that locality for the purpose of gaining access to its facilities, and
permit the efficient operation of public housing projects. It is also
argued that residency requirements, by keeping out non-resident
needy families, and thus limiting housing needs, make it more likely
as Id.
34 Id.
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that a community will disregard tax burdens and real estate losses
and vote for at least minimal low-rent public housing."
Although most local housing authorities have no residency rules
except that the applicant be a resident of the city at the time he
makes out his application, a few require that he have resided in the
city for a certain period of time." It is true that there is no federal
statutory residency standard; however, because HUD allows local
authorities to set policies for admission, local standards may be
applied to federally-financed projects in a particular city so as to
create "federal" residency requirements."
Unlike the income standard, however, residency requirements
have recently come under legal attack as being violative of the appli-
cant's constitutional rights. In Shapiro v. Thompson," a case involv-
ing the denial of assistance to welfare applicants, the United States
Supreme Court held that a one year residency requirement, in order
to qualify for welfare benefits in Connecticut, Pennsylvania, and the
District of Columbia, was a form of invidious discrimination against
persons who were merely exercising their constitutionally guaranteed
right to travel." The Court held that only a compelling governmental
interest, which it did not find present, could validate such a require-
ment.'
83 The constitutional question of a local referendum to approve or reject low-rent
housing projects was recently decided in James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971). The
district court had held Article XXXIV of the California Constitution unconstitutional
because it denied low income people, those who would be the beneficiaries of such projects,
equal protection of the laws. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that "the record here
would not support any claim that a law seemingly neutral on its face is in fact aimed at a
racial minority." 402 U.S. at 141. However, the dissenting opinion of Justice Marshall
argued that such a referendum imposed a "substantial burden" on the poor. The California
provision was viewed by the dissent as violating the Fourteenth Amendment by making
"an explicit classification on the basis of poverty—a suspect classification which demands
exacting judicial scrutiny." 402 U.S. at 144-45. In these days of rising costs and diluted
revenues, one need not be cynical to suggest that the fiscally-conscious voter might relegate
low-income projects to the bottom of municipal priorities.
80 See Comment, Public Housing, 22 Vand. L. Rev. 875, 915 (1969).
37 HUD Handbook, RHA 7401.1, ch. 9, § 1, appendix 2; contra, the district court
decision in Cole v. Housing Authority of City of Newport, 312 F. Supp. 692, 696 (D.R.I.
1970).
There is no statutory residency requirement in the State of New York. However, as
In other jurisdictions which have no local statutory residency requirement, state-funded
local authorities in New York may promulgate such a requirement under their grant of
power to formulate internal regulations. NYCRR § 1627-3.1(a). In Massachusetts, a six-
month residency requirement was revoked recently by the legislature. The statute now
reads, "[n]o inhabitant of the city or town or no person employed in the city or town
in which the project is located shall be refused eligibility to a waiting list or occupancy
based solely upon the grounds of a residency prerequisite." Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch.
121B, § 32(e) (Supp. 1971).
38 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
00 Id. at 629-31.
40 Id. at 634.
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In Cole v. Housing Authority of the City of Newport,' a case
involving federal low-rent public housing, the First Circuit struck
down a two year residency requirement." In finding that the dura-
tional residency requirement violated the right to travel as set out in
Shapiro, the court interpreted the Supreme Court's definition of the
right to travel to include "the sense of migration with intent to settle
and abide."' As was the case in Shapiro, a compelling state interest
in the requirement was found to be lacking. "Even by a standard of
rational relationship to a permissible goal, we doubt that the justifica-
tions put forth by the Authority could withstand judicial scrutiny." 4
Thus, it would appear that the initially expansive discretion given the
local housing authorities has been curtailed by successful constitu-
tional challenges. Yet, the underlying problem of inadequate and con-
fusing guidelines for housing authorities remains, with the sole
prospect of relief resting in costly litigation.
In Lane v. McGarry," a federal district court upheld the one
year residency requirement of the state-funded Syracuse Housing
Authority, holding that the requirement was a "valid and enforceable
regulation."" The decision seems to have been based primarily upon
the court's determination that the requirement did not curtail the
plaintiff's right to travel.° Having found that there was no violation,
the court determined that it did not have to reach the question of
whether there existed a compelling state interest in maintaining the
residency requirement."
The impact of Lane, however, was vitiated by the Second Circuit
in King v. New Rochelle Municipal Housing Authority." In that case,
a state-aided housing authority had required that at least one member
of an applicant family have been a local resident for five consecutive
years before that family was eligible for admission to public housing.
The plaintiff, who had resided in the city for four years and eight
months prior to seeking admission, was twice denied a housing authority
41 435 F.2d 807 (1st Cir. 1970).
42 Id. at 813.
48 Id. at 811.
44 Id. at 813. The Authority argued before the First Circuit that a durations] residency
requirement made the advent of more housing in the community possible because the
electorate would vote for it, not fearing a great influx of prospective low-income tenants.
The Authority had dropped the two principal arguments offered in support of the residency
requirement—namely, that "the residency requirement is useful in planning" for future
growth of the community, and that there is an obligation to house one's own residents
before accepting outsiders.
46 320 F. Supp. 562 (N.D.N.Y. 1970).
48 Id. at 565.
47 Id. at 564. The court specifically stated that it disagreed with the district court
decision in Cole v. Housing Authority of the City of Newport.
48 Id. at 563.
40 442 F.2d 646 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. — (1971).
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application form during the spring of 1970 because she had not been
a resident for the required period. The Second Circuit held that, in
light of Shapiro, a durational residency requirement in public housing
is violative of equal protection of the laws.° In contrast to the decision
in Lane, the King court held, with regard to the right to travel, that
"we do find that the residency requirement penalizes respondents by
adding an additional period of as much as five years to the time they
must wait for public housing and that this penalty is imposed solely
because they have recently exercised their right to travel."° 1
The court also dismissed the housing authority's argument that
"intrastate" travel was to be distinguished from "interstate" travel .°
It stated that "[i] t would be meaningless to describe the right to
travel between states as a fundamental precept of personal liberty and
not to acknowledge a correlative constitutional right to travel within
a state."° Finally, the court found no compelling governmental in-
terest upon which to predicate a residency requirement. The attempt
by the appellant housing authority to "care for its own first," lacking
any other rationale, was rejected as violative of equal protection of
the laws." Thus, the prevailing trend in constitutional law appears to
favor striking down residency requirements. The abolition of such
requirements will certainly benefit prospective public housing tenants.
However, the latter must still confront the subtle, yet effective, policies
of discrimination practiced in many areas.
E. Discrimination
In attempting to determine valid criteria for housing applicants,
public housing authorities may legitimately establish preferences based
upon non-racial categories. The controlling statute allows authorities to
give preference to persons with low income, victims of disasters and
veterans." Authorities may even exclude potentially undesirable ten-
ants, such as persons who have extensive criminal records or drug prob-
lems, although, as shall be seen, the entire area of applicant desirability
is currently undergoing judicial scrutiny.° In Gautreaux v. Chicago
so Id. , at 649.
51 Id. at 648.
52 Id.
58 Id. See Valenciano v. Bateman, 323 F. Supp. 600 (D. Ariz. 1971), which further
enforces this view. It was held in this welfare case that a one year residency requirement,
in order to receive non-emergency medical care provided by a county, violates the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by infringing upon the right to travel.
The court held that "[we] can see no distinction between the constitutional right to travel
interstate . . . as held by Shapiro, and a constitutional right to travel intrastate." Id. at
603.
54 422 F.2d at 649.
55 42 U.S.C. § 1410(g)(1)-(3) (1970).
86 See discussion at p. 47 infra.
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Housing Authority," a federal district court enjoined the city housing
authority, financed by federal grants, from applying discriminatory ten-
ant assignment practices and site selection procedures. The court found
that the authority had fixed a quota for the number of Blacks who could
reside in certain of its projects: " [t]he disparity between the low
number of Negro families in these projects and the high number of
Negro applicants for all projects indicates that CHA [Chicago Housing
Authority] has imposed a Negro quota."" In other words, the author-
ity had carefully controlled the number of Black applications that it
accepted." In approving the CHA's Tenant Assignment Plan, the
court did allow a "benign quota" to remain; that is, it allowed the
authority to deny admission to eligible Blacks and members of other
minority groups to certain projects in order to maintain a predeter-
mined racial mix in these locations." The quota does not specifically
deny eligibility for public housing to these persons in the manner which
arguably occurred previously, although it makes the waiting list period
57 296 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. El. 1969).
58 Id. at 909.
GO The Seventh Circuit rejected an appeal by the Chicago Housing Authority that
the specific timetable established subsequent to, the district court's order (in 304 F. Supp.
736 (ND. III. 1969)) be set aside on several grounds, among them, that the district judge
had abused his discretion:
In view of the fact that HUD-approved sites for 1500 Dwelling Units were
awaiting submission to the City Council and that the arguments put forward in
favor of delaying submission were based on political considerations and com-
munity hostility, reasons which had been properly rejected by the lower court in
the original litigation, we hold that it was no abuse of discretion for the District
Judge to impose deadlines for submission one year after the entry of the original
"best efforts" order.
436 F.2d 306, 313 (7th Cir. 1970), application for stay denied, 401 U.S. 953 (1971).
00 The court approved a plan containing provisions designed to prevent certain
existing housing projects from becoming racially segregated. Ostensibly, vacancies in a
housing project were to be filled according to numbers given to applicants at the time of
their registration and "depending only upon bedroom size." However, applicants were
allowed to designate a choice of locale and the court's final order recognized the CHA's
plan of "community areas," in which eligible resident-applicants were given priority. In
filling the vacancies in four specific projects, the court's order required that vacancies
be offered
to eligible applicants on the appropriate list in such manner that not more than
approximately fifteen per cent (15%) of all dwelling units in any of the projects
shall from time to time be occupied by Negro families; and in such manner that
not more than approximately twenty-five per cent (25%) of all dwelling units
in any of the projects shall from time to time be occupied by other minority
families.
Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, No. 66 C 1459 (N.D. III., docketed Nov. 24,
1969), modifying 304 F. Supp. 736, enforcing 296 F. Supp. 907 (1969), found in Poverty
Law Rep., 1110,696. One author has commented that although the constitutionality of
percent figures may be questionable, some "figure does seem reasonable if integrated public
housing is One's goal and if white panic fleeing remains an empirical fact." Nagel, Dis-
crimination Issues in Public Housing, 28 Legal Aid Brief Case 89, 90 (1970).
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for admission to specified projects quite long. The result, however, is
practically the same.
The constitutionality of the system of "benign quotas" has been
substantially settled.' In at least one case the principle of benign
quotas has been rejected outright. In Colon v. Tompkins Square
Neighbors, Inc.,82 a federal district court stated, with reference to
tenant selection guidelines and policy, that:
[T]he document, in its reference to the desirability of a
"balanced tenant body", vaguely smacks of a quota system
which, in the opinion of this Court, represents a constitu-
tionally impermissible process requiring arbitrary rejection
of applicants after a set quota has been met.'
In Colon, the plaintiffs, New York residents, alleged they were refused
admission to a privately-run, publicly-financed low-income housing
project, solely on the grounds that they were recipients of welfare
funds. This, they argued, denied them their right to equal protection
under the laws." The court found that the housing authority's action
with regard to welfare recipients bore no relation to any reasonable
classification system and thus struck it down as invalid."
Discriminatory admission policies present little difficulty when
the LHA is found to be systematically denying applications from
particular racial, ethnic or status groups. Colon is useful for dealing
with this type of situation. But when the issue becomes one of
benevolent quotas, the solution is not so simple. 6° Where an application
61 Cf. Progress Development Corp. v. Mitchell, 182 F. Supp. 681, 707 (ND. Ill.
1960) ; Detroit Housing Commission v. Lewis, 226 F.2d 180 (6th Cir. 1955) ; Taylor v.
Leonard, 30 N.J. Super. 116, 103 A.2d 632 (1954) ; Banks v. Housing Authority of the
City and County of San Francisco, 120 Cal. App. 2d 1, 260 P.2d 668 (1953), cert. denied,
347 U.S. 974 (1954).
For commentary on benign housing quotas, see Bittker, The Case of the Checker-
Board Ordinance: An Experiment in Race Relations, 71 Yale L.J. 1387 (1962); Hellerstein,
The Benign Quota, Equal Protection, and "The Rule in Shelley's Case," 17 Rutgers L.
Rev. 531 (1963) ; Horowitz, Fourteenth Amendment Aspects of Racial Discrimination in
"Private" Housing, 52 Calif. L. Rev. 1 (1964) ; Kaplan, Equal Justice in an Unequal
World: Equality for the Negro—The Problem of Special Treatment, 61 Nw. U.L. Rev.
363, 388-98 (1966) ; Navasky, The Benevolent Housing Quota, 6 How. L.J. 30 (1960) ;
Public Housing and Integration: A Neglected Opportunity, 6 Colum. J. of Law and Soc.
Prob. 235 (1970).
62 294 F. Supp. 134 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
68 Id. at 139.
64 Id. at 138.
65 Id. The issue of discrimination in tenant selection by local housing authorities in
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts has not yet beer. raised in a court test. As regards
tenant selection, the Massachusetts statute states only that, "for all purposes of this
chapter no person shall, because of race, color, creed or religion, be subjected to any
discrimination or segregation." Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 12113, 32(e) (Supp. 1971).
66 Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, No. 66 C 1459 (ND. Ill., docketed Nov.
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quota procedure is used, a longer waiting list will result for those
persons from the largest racial, ethnic or status group seeking admis-
sion. This, of course, raises basic equal protection questions. Yet, if
no quota is applied, segregated public housing will likely result. The
constitutionality of racial and ethnic quotas for admission to public
housing, as noted, has not yet been decided.
None of this, of course, precludes the local housing authorities
from employing the subterfuge of desirability tests, should they wish
to engage in quota practices. Such tests may effectively disguise the
practice of racial segregation.
F. Desirability Standards
Admissions standards concerning desirability provide LHA's their
greatest latitude in choosing future tenants. There exists no precise
federal statute defining standards for desirability. The HUD Unified
Issuances System is similarly lacking in standards. Thus a housing
authority, insofar as it operates a federally-funded operation, has
great discretion and no precise regulatory checks.
The only federally-enunciated curtailment of this discretion came
on December 17, 1968, when HUD issued a circular (known as HUD
Circular 12/17/68) establishing rules and regulations which local
authorities were to follow in determining admission to, and continued
occupancy of, low-rent public housing:
2b. A local authority shall not establish policies which auto-
matically deny admission or continued occupancy to a par-
ticular class, such as unmarried mothers, families having one
or more children born out of wedlock, families having police
records or poor rent paying habits, etc."
The language of the circular remained discretionary until it was given
the weight of a federal regulation, as part of the Unified Issuances
System, by the Supreme Court in Thorpe v. Housing Authority of the
City of Durham."
The circular, as quoted above, would appear at first glance to have
great thrust, especially in light of the Thorpe decision. But words such
as "automatically" and "et cetera" obstruct its effectiveness. Local
authorities continue to implement their own desirability standards as
recent cases, to be discussed in this section, indicate. Although LHA's
24, 1969), modifying 304 F. Supp, 736, enforcing 296 F. Supp. 907. See discussion p. 44
supra.
OT "Admission and Continued Occupancy Regulations for Low-Rent Public Housing,"
Department of Housing and Urban Development Circular (Dec. 17, 1968).
es 393 U.S. 268 (1969). It is important to note that this decision actually dealt
with another Circular, that of Feb. 7, 1967, the subject of which was "Termination of
Tensity in Low-Rent Projects."
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are required to publish their rules and regulations," they do so in a
rather scarce document entitled "Statement of Policy Concerning
Admission to and Continued Occupany of Federally-Assisted Pro-
jects."' In spite of, or perhaps, because of Circular 12/17/68, this
document may set out only minimal standards. Thus, when an orga-
nization, legal services office or prospective applicant finally obtains a
copy, there still may be no way of evaluating the chances of gaining
admission. However, in the usual situation, the applicant never even
knows that there exists a desirability standard until he is rejected for
failing to meet it. There do exist state standards in this area, but they
tend to be no more explicit than their federal counterparts. In New
York there is no reference to standards of desirability in the Public
Housing Law. 71
 There is some reference within Title 9-C NYCRR,
similar in wording to Circular 12/17/68:
Standards of Desirability. It shall be a ground for eligibility
for admission or continued occupancy in any authority proj-
ect, that the applicant or tenant will be or is a desirable
tenant. The standard to be used in approving eligibility for
admission or continued occupancy of a family shall be that
the family will not or does not constitute (a) a detriment
to the health, safety or morals of its neighbors or the com-
munity, (b) an adverse influence upon sound family and
community life, (c) a source of danger to the peaceful occu-
pation of the other tenants, (d) a source of danger or cause
09
 The Consolidated Annual Contributions Contract issued by the Department of
Housing and Urban Development, HUD-53011, (Nov., 1969) contains the following
provision:
Sec. 206. Admission Policies
The Local Authority shall duly adopt and promulgate, by publication or
posting in a conspicuous place for examination by prospective tenants regulations
establishing its arlrniction policies. Such regulations must be reasonable and give
full consideration to its public responsibility for rehousing displaced families, to
the applicant's status as a serviceman or veteran or relationship to a serviceman
or veteran or to a disabled serviceman or veteran and to the applicant's age or
disability, housing conditions, urgency of housing need, and source of income,
and shall accord to families consisting of two or more persons such priority over
families consisting of single persons as the Local Authority determines to be
necessary to avoid undue hardship.
70
 HUD Handbook, RHA 7401.1 ch. 9, 1, appendix 2. It is interesting to note that
these rules and regulations are often difficult to obtain even by legal services groups.
According to a letter dated May 13, 1970, from Joseph J. Kohler, former Director,
Tenant and Operations Services Division, Region I, to the Legal Aid Society of
Westchester County, HUD's policy is to have local authorities release this information.
It is this writer's experience that local authorities fail to comply. For a contrary opinion,
see Comment, Public Housing, 22 Vand. L. Rev. 875, 926 (1969), "a local authority is
almost certain to comply with the federal requirement that information on admissions
procedures be easily obtainable."
71 N.Y. Public Housing Law 156 (McKinney, 1955), as amended, (Supp. 1970).
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of damage to the premises or property of the authority, or
(e) a nuisance."
In the Massachusetts statute there is no reference to a standard
of desirability. The pertinent section of this law" refers to "family"
several times and allows for discretion by the authority to the extent
that it may decide, for example, what constitutes a family. However,
all other references in the law are to standards based on income. At
the federal level, because the statutory framework is so weak, the
litigation concerning the concept of desirability tends to be very basic
in nature. In addition, the standards involved in the decisions often
come from state statutes similar to those of the New York law, as set
forth in Title 9-C NYCRR. Finally, there is a lack of precedent from
which a sophisticated definition of desirability may be fashioned.'"
One standard of desirability upon which courts have ruled in-
volves sexual conduct. In Thomas v. Housing Authority of City of
Little Rock," the first case to treat the issue, a federal district court
held that a housing authority could not automatically exclude from
public housing all families "unfortunate enough to have or acquire
one or more illegitimate children."" The court found that the housing
authority policy automatically excluding all unwed mothers who other-
wise would qualify for admission could not be sustained: "In the
Court's estimation the fatal vices of the policy are its inflexibility,
and its general disharmony with the spirit and aim of the low rent
housing program."'" The holding appears to be purposely drawn in a
narrow fashion. The court specifically explained that it was not find-
ing improper the right of a housing authority to maintain a desirability
standard concerning illegitimacy, or, as expressed in Thomas, "an un-
wed mother policy."' Nonetheless, there are statements in the de-
72 NYCRR § 1627-7.2. It further states that "in making such determination considera-
tion shall be given to the family composition, parental control over children, family
stability, medical and other past history, reputation, conduct and behavior, criminal
record, if any, occupation of wage earners, and any other data or information with respect
to the family that has a bearing upon its desirability, including its conduct or behavior
while residing in a project."
79 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 121B, § 32 (Supp. 1971).
74 	§ 1410(g) (2 ) (1970) states in part: "the public housing agency shall
adopt and promulgate regulations establishing admission policies which shall give full
consideration to its responsibility for the rehousing of displaced families, to the applicant's
status as a serviceman . . . and to . . . age or disability, housing conditions, urgency of
housing need, and source of income . • . ." See language in the standard contract between
the federal government and MIA's excerpted in note 69 supra.
75 282 F. Supp. 575 (E.D. Ark. 1967).
70
 Id. at 580.
77 Id.
79 Id. at 581. "[T]he Court thinks that the Authority might permissibly formulate
a policy giving some evidentiary or presumptive effect to the presence of illegitimate
children in a family group, particularly where there are more than one of such children,
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cision which permit various interpretations. The court pointed to the
fact that a lack of illegitimacy did not presuppose morality. Moreover,
it stated that the effect of an unwed mother policy could be to deny
benefits to those who are most in need of public housing.
The effect of Thomas was to open the area to debate, as evidenced
by the recent federal district court decision in McDougal v. Tams-
berg." In that case a mother of five children attacked the constitu-
tionality of the housing authority eligibility policy under which she
was declared ineligible for public housing. The court commented that
although low-income families may have no vested right to acceptance
and occupancy in a low-rent project, it is equally certain that a denial
of admission cannot be predicated on unconstitutional regulations or
practices which project a denial of equal and constitutional treat-
ment." The court read Thomas narrowly, interpreting it to hold only
that one could not automatically exclude persons because of their
status as unwed mothers. The court in McDougal further stated that
[a] large number of illegitimate children, each by different
men, is a factor which may be considered by the Housing
Authority in screening applicants for its facilities in order
to eliminate those whose conduct might constitute criminal
activity, or disorderly conduct, or which might amount to a
nuisance or seriously violate ordinary standards of de-
cency.'
The question left unanswered by McDougal is what precisely is
so detrimental about families with large numbers of illegitimate
children that makes them undesirable tenants. In addition, the court
did not decide whether in fact it is the duty of the housing authority
to provide accommodations specifically for these members of society,
or whether the local authority must afford persons found ineligible
on this ground certain procedural rights, such as a hearing.
A second standard of desirability—criminal activity—has been
the subject of extensive litigation. The landmark case in this area is
Manigo v. New York City Housing Authority." In that case, petitioner
brought an action to set aside a decision of the New York City Housing
Authority finding her family ineligible for low-income public housing
on grounds that her husband had a criminal record. Petitioner's hus-
where they are of recent birth, and where the births have followed each other in quick
succession."
19 308 F. Supp. 1212 (D.S.C. 1970).
89 Id. at 1215.
81 Id. at 1216.
82 51 Misc. 2d 829, 273 N.Y.S.2d 1003 (Sup. Ct. 1966), aff'd mem., 27 App. Div. 2d
803, 279 N.Y.S.2d 1014, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1008 (1967).
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band bad been arrested seven times during the eight years immediately
preceding the making of the application. On four occasions the husband
had been adjudicated a juvenile delinquent or youthful offender. Two
years prior to the time his wife sought admission, he had spent ten
days in jail for disorderly conduct. He bad also been arrested for
possession of drugs, but the charges were dropped. The court found
that although the fact that he had been adjudicated a youthful offender
alone was not enough to disallow him the benefits of certain laws, it
held that he could be granted or denied "a right or privilige," such as
admission to public housing, based upon a study of his entire behavior
pattern over a period of years." No Fourteenth Amendment equal
protection violation was found by the court. In addition, the court
cited the housing authority's "Resolution Relating to Desirability as
as a Ground for Eligibility," and stated:
There can be no doubt that the respondent [Housing
Authority], to protect the large concentration of children and
elderly persons who reside within its properties, must take
steps to prevent the development of unsafe conditions therein.
Without a proper screening of prospective tenants the dan-
gers to those persons residing therein would be multiplied
many times over."
The question remains, however, whether the court gave its stamp
of approval to the New York City Housing Authority's standards for
judging non-desirability, or whether non-desirability would have been
found in this case under any standard." A second question remaining
is how much criminal activity is needed to make one ineligible. If
Manigo is to be the standard, it would appear that some pattern of
criminal activity must be found although neither a series of convic-
tions nor a serious crime need be shown."
HUD Circular 12/17/68 is also applicable to the admission stan-
dard involving criminal activity. It provides that "[a] Local Author-
ity shall not establish policies which automatically deny admission or
continued occupancy to a particular class, such as . . . families having
88 Id. at 832, 273 N.Y.S.2d at 1005.
84 Id. at 831, 273 N.Y.S.2d at 1004.
85 Id, at 830-31, 273 N.Y.S.2d at 1004, quoting Resolution Relating to Desirability
as a Ground for Eligibility, Authority Res. No. 12-9-683: "The standard to be used in
approving eligibility for admission or continued occupancy of a family shall be that the
family will not or does not constitute (1) a detriment to the health, safety or morals
of its neighbors or the community, (2) an adverse influence upon sound family and
community life, (3) a source of danger to the peaceful occupation of the other tenants,
(4) a source of danger or cause of damage to the premises or property of the Authority,
or (5) a nuisance."
88 See New York City Housing Authority v. Watson, 23 Misc. 2d 408, 189 N.Y.S.2d
274 (Sup. Ct. 1959); Sanders v. Cruise, 10 Misc. 2c1 533, 173 N.Y.S.2d 871 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
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police records .. .87
 It analogizes to the absoluteness test in Thomas
to state that criminal activity, like illegitimacy, cannot be an absolute
ground for a denial of admission.
The courts have not seen the last of litigation over desirability
standards. As the number and complexity of these cases increase, the
courts will be forced to make determinations which are often socio-
logical in nature. There is great diversity of opinion as to the purpose
of low-rent public housing. For example, there is controversy as to
whether the goal of public housing is a better social environment or
a better physical environment for the tenants." Such a question is
sociological as well as legal. The courts' resolution of the question of
proper desirability standards may be premised either upon their
opinion of the proper function of public housing, or upon their juris-
diction to make such a decision, or both. Another sociological problem,
not treated in this article, is whether desirability standards are im-
proper because they are the result of forced middle class standards."
Despite their reluctance to become involved in the evaluation of
eligibility standards," the courts will be forced, sooner or later, to face
these difficult problems.
MANAGEMENT PRACTICES AND THE RIGHT TO A HEARING
The basic method of dealing with an adverse admissions policy
determination is through a hearing. Arguably, if a proper hearing took
place upon rejection, many of the issues concerning admission stan-
dards might be resolved without litigation. This procedural device has
become a complex issue in its own right. While a particular statute
might compel some form of hearing, an underlying consideration is
whether rudimentary constitutional principles, such as due process,
81 HUD Circular (12-17-68) § 2b "Admission and Continued Occupancy Regulations
for Low-Rent Public Housing."
88 M. Rosen, Tenant's Rights in Public Housing Project on Social Welfare Law,
24-25, 31 (unpublished paper in N.Y.U. School of Law Library 1967).
80 For an excellent commentary, see, Schoshinski, Public Landlords and Tenants: A
Survey of the Developing Law, 1969 Duke L.J. 399. The author comments that
[t]he admission policies of the [sic] most Local Authorities are totally discordant
with the purpose of the national public housing program. "It makes little sense
to deprive a poor family of perhaps its only comfort—decent housing—because
the extra mouth to feed belongs to a bastard rather than a legitimate child," or
because one member of the family many years before had committed an "unde-
sirable act."
Id. at 434.
9° In Davis v. Toledo Metropolitan Housing Authority, 311 F. Supp. 795 (N.D.
Ohio 1970), the court granted the plaintiffs' demands that the Housing Authority conduct
hearings before it may reject an applicant. However, the court, despite its requirement
that the Housing Authority issue detailed reasons for its decisions, reaffirmed the validity of
a statute delegating discretion. It concluded that "pit is an exercise in futility to expect to
procure justice by eliminating all need for the exercise of judgment and discretion." Id. at
797.
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demand a hearing in all situations where applicants have been rejected.
There exists one federal statute which affords a right to a hearing
when an LHA determines that a person is ineligible for low-rent hous-
ing. However, it speaks only of "an opportunity for an informal
hearing."" The New York Public Housing Law contains no statement
concerning hearings. In Title 9-C NYCRR, there is reference to "ap-
peals" by which the rejected applicant may apply in writing for a
hearing within thirty days after notice of his ineligibility. At the
hearing he may be represented by counsel or other representative."
No reference is made to the specific type of hearing, whether there
will be a right to confrontation, or whether notice will be given con-
cerning the reasons for rejection 9 3 In Massachusetts there is no
provision for a review procedure when an applicant is rejected. The
right to a hearing applies only in cases of termination of tenancy."
There are only two cases which deal with the question of hearings
upon rejection of an applicant for admission to low-rent public housing.
In Sumpter v. White Plains Housing Authority," now being appealed
to the New York State Court of Appeals, the Appellate Division
overturned the trial court's decision that petitioner had a right to an
evidentiary hearing, complete with legal counsel, and the right to con-
front witnesses and testify in his own behalf:
In our view, the administrative complications and bur-
dens attendant upon the various housing authorities in the
91
 42 U.S.C, § 2410(g)(4) (1970) provides:
the public housing agency shall promptly notify (1) any applicant determined to
be ineligible for admission to the project of the basis for such determination and
provide the applicant upon request, within a reasonable time after the determina-
tion is made, with an opportunity for an informal hearing on such determination,
and (ii) any applicant determined to be eligible for admission to the project of
the approximate date of occupancy insofar as such date can be reasonably de-
termined.
92 NYCRR § 1627-7.3(b).
NYCRR	 1627-7.2: "Any applicant or tenant determined to be ineligible by
virtue of the standard herein set forth shall be declared to be ineligible on the ground
of non-desirability." In New York this is the only information required to be given a
person,
94 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 121B, § 32(g) (Supp. 1971).
The tenancy of a tenant of a housing authority shall not be terminated without
cause and without reasons therefor given to said tenant in writing. A tenant at his
request shall, except in the case of nonpayment of rent, be granted a bearing by
a housing authority at least fifteen days prior to any such termination. The
housing authority's determination of cause shall be reviewable in the district court
whenever an action for summary process is brought for possession of the premises.
There is no reason why this procedure could not be made available to applicants as well
as to tenants. Although the administrative burden would be great, the procedure would
at least have the salutary effect of insuring that applications are evaluated according to
specific criteria.
95 36 App, Div. 2d 728, 320 N.Y.S.2d 472 (1971), reversing 63 Misc. 2d 654, 313
N.Y.S.2d 133 (1970).
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State preclude the rigid requirement ordered by Special Term
for a "full evidentiary hearing" in each case of rejection."
The court appears to have based its decision almost entirely upon
representations made at oral argument that at least 9,411 applications
for public housing had been rejected during 1970." No doubt, the
court was concerned that a decision giving a right to a hearing in each
such case would result in administrative hardship on the various state
housing authorities. It should be noted, however, that of the 9,411
rejections, only 483 were based on non-desirability. The remaining,
presumably, were for reasons of income, family size and residency.
Since non-desirability is the standard upon which hearings are gener-
ally sought and over which local authorities have the most discretion,
a decision to grant hearings would have gone far to resolve the "right
to a hearing" problem without unduly burdening the LHA's. Unfortu-
nately, the basic constitutional question of the right to a hearing was
not reached despite an attempt to analogize to the right-to-hearing
available to persons denied welfare benefits."
Davis v. Toledo Metropolitan Housing Authority" reached a
result similar to that of the trial court in Sumpter. It found that peti-
tioners were entitled to both injunctive relief and a bearing, as well as
a statement from the housing authority indicating to them exactly
which desirability standards they did not meet.'" With reference to
the hearing, the court held that "the Authority must render findings
of fact and conclusions as to the plaintiffs' eligibility. This would not
be accomplished by merely stating that the plaintiffs were ineligible
on the grounds of undesirability."' However, the court did not find
that the desirability standards promulgated by the Authority violated
in any way petitioners' constitutional rights. 102
 It is submitted that a
retention of those general standards, coupled with the requirement of
specificity in factual determinations, does little to expand on the mean-
ing of desirability.
The principles applied in Davis and Sumpter are derived from the
06 320 N.Y.S.2d at 473.
07 Id.
99 Accord, Barnett v. Lindsay, 319 F. Supp. 610 (D. Utah 1970). "The rule established
by Goldberg [v. Kelly] was grounded on the constitutional hypothesis that welfare bene-
fits 'are a matter of statutory entitlement . . . As such, summary denial of welfare
assistance cannot be distinguished from summary termination. Just as the entitlement is
created by statute for the benefit of needy persons meeting specified qualifications, so the
rights surrounding that entitlement are created when the statutorily defined need arises
and not after the benefits have been dispensed." Id. at 612.
09 311 F. Supp. 795 (ND. Ohio 1970).
100
 Id. at 797-98.
101 Id. at 798.
102 Id.
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decisions in a long series of public housing eviction cases which held
that a housing authority does not have the same freedom to evict
tenants as does a private landlord. In 1955, the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia, in Rudder v. United States,'" ruled that
"[t] he government as landlord is still the government. It must not act
arbitrarily, for, unlike private landlords, it is subject to the require-
ments of due process of law. Arbitrary action is not due process."'"
The Second Circuit in Escalera v. New York City Housing Authority"
recently held that although local rules may measure up to HUD
regulations with regard to termination of tenancy, these rules may
still fail if they do not comply with due process standards."'
In support of their prayer for relief, petitioners in both Davis
and Sumpter cited Goldberg v. Kelly.'" In that case, the Supreme
Court held that a full evidentiary hearing was required before ter-
mination of assistance could occur in a welfare case. The Court con-
cluded that procedural due process mandated adequate notice giving
reasons for the termination, the opportunity to defend by presenting
one's own evidence and arguments, and the right to confront and
cross examine adverse witnesses. Of course, the Goldberg holding can-
not be interpreted as compelling a formal hearing in all types of agency
decisions. Yet, the rationale that governmental bodies should not act
arbitrarily suggests that applicants for any state-bestowed benefit,
such as low-income housing, should be treated fairly and with due
regard for their rights as citizens. The immediate hardship that results
from the summary rejection of one's housing application could be
mitigated by the implementation of procedures which insure conscien-
tious evaluation of applications.
One other decision referred to by petitioner-applicant in Sumpter
is worthy of note. In Williams v. White Plains Housing Authority," a
public housing eviction case, the standards of the hearing requirement
were held to include
103 226 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
104
 Id. at 53. There are numerous cases on point in this area: Vinson v. Greenburgh
Housing Authority, 29 App. Div. 2d 338, 288 N.Y.S.2d 159 (1968), aff'd per curiam, 27
N.Y.2d 675, 262 N.E.2d 211, 314 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1970) ; Ruffin v. Housing Authority,
301 F. Supp. 251 (E.D. La. 1969) ; Chicago Housing Authority v. Blackman, 4 III. 2d 319,
122 N.E.2d 522 (1954) ; Kutcher v. Housing Authority of City of Newark, 20 N.J. 181,
119 A.2d 1 (1955) ; Lawson v. Housing Authority of the City of Milwaukee, 270 Wis. 269,
70 N.W.2d 605, cert. denied, 350 U.S. 882 (1955) ; Housing Authority of City of Los
Angeles v. Cordova, 130 Cal. App. 2d 883, 279 P.2d 215 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1955), cert.
denied, 350 U.S. 969 (1956).
100 425 F.2d 853 (2d Cir. 1970).
100
 Id. at 861.
107 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
100
 62 Misc. 2d 613, 309 N.Y.S.2d 454 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 35 App, Div. 2d 965, 317
N.Y.S.2d 935 (1970).
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adequate notice both of the acts which form the basis of the
tenant's alleged undesirability and the consequences of an
adverse determination, together with the right to be repre-
sented by counsel, to confront witnesses and to challenge
the evidence upon which the Authority relies in making its
determination."°
The court in effect found the regulations under Title 9-C NYCRR
inadequate.
To date, there has been no judicial determination of the elements
of a hearing in an ineligibility situation. None of the federal decisions
sheds any light on the issue except Escalera, but that case dealt with
evictions, rent increases, and fines. Goldberg and Williams are the
cases giving the best insights into the components of a full evidentiary
hearing. If a court finds, as the Appellate Division did in Sumpter,
that a Goldberg-Williams hearing is not administratively feasible, the
following choices are available. First, the court could choose a diluted
form of Goldberg hearing, in which procedural formalities would not
apply. Second, it could apply the interview hearing presently given
in New York under the Public Housing Law and Title 9-C NYCRR.
Third, it could grant no hearing at all, with documentary evidence
and affidavits being submitted to a board of review for decision. Fourth,
it could grant no hearing and relegate the rejected applicant to seeking
judicial review of the authority's ruling. Finally, it could grant a judicial
evidentiary hearing to determine desirability. Under present standards,
rejected applicants do not receive full-scale evidentiary hearings. In
fact, they rarely are made aware of their right to know the reasons
for their rejection. It is submitted, however, that even were these in-
dividuals granted such evidentiary hearings, they generally would not
be able to represent themselves adequately. Therefore, this form of
hearing must provide either protection for the applicant who is in-
experienced in such situations, or some system of representation. The
hearing could be conducted by a disinterested party. A lay advocate
system of representation using community members, project inhabi-
tants, or, if they are available, legal services attorneys, might be intro-
duced.
In addition to providing an excellent discussion of the need for
an evidentiary hearing, the Davis decision shows how quickly a
federal court can get to the merits of the case if it so desires. There
was no problem with state review, jurisdiction or abstention. These
topics had been stumbling blocks in the past. Arguments by housing
authorities on these points were rejected in both Escalera and Holmes
log 35 App. Div. 2d at 965, 31 17 N.Y.S.2d at 936.
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v. New York City Housing Authority,'" where the issues on the merits
were similar to those in Davis.'" In regard to abstention and state
review, the court in Holmes felt that there would not be so great a
disruption of local regulatory procedure as to make federal interven-
tion inappropriate. With regard to jurisdiction, the court in Escalera
found that cases of this type contain substantial federal questions.
With reference to abstention, the Holmes court stated that:
At least in actions under the Civil Rights Act the power
of a federal court to abstain from hearing and deciding
the merits of claims properly brought before it is a closely
restricted one which may be invoked only in a narrowly
limited set of "special circumstances!""
There is one additional area in which the prospective applicant
has encountered difficulty when dealing with a housing authority. As
has already been discussed, it is often difficult to obtain information
from the authority. Of great interest to the applicant is finding out the
length of the waiting list and his position on the list. Some authorities
maintain such lists and they will divulge such information. In New
York, Title 9-C NYCRR requires the keeping of such lists. However,
eligible families are not always told where they stand. Two cases herein-
before discussed have dealt with the issue of waiting lists. In Holmes
v. New York City Housing Authority, 1 8
 the Second Circuit, in sustain-
ing a cause of action with regard to admission to public housing, held
that
due process requires that selections among applicants be made
in accordance with "ascertainable standards," . . . and in cases
where many candidates are equally qualified under these
standards, that further selections be made in some reason-
able manner such as "by lot or on the basis of the chrono-
logical order of application."'"
In Colon v. Tomkins Square Neighbors, Inc., 118 a case in which dis-
crimination against welfare recipients who applied for housing was held
to be a violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
110 395 F.2d 262 (2d Cir. 1968).
111 The Davis court found no difficulty in applying the Goldberg holding to public
housing. "It seems clear, therefore, that those seeking to be declared eligible for public
benefits may not be declared ineligible without the opportunity to have an evidentiary
hearing." 311 F. Supp. at 797.
112 398 F.2d at 265, citing Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 248 (1967). For similar
language in Escalera, see 425 F.2d at 865.
na 398 F.2d 262, (2d Cir. 1968).
114 Id. at 265, quoting Hornsby v. Allen, 330 F.2d 55, 56 (5th Cir. 1964).
115 294 F. Supp. 134 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). See discussion at p. 46 supra.
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Amendment, the court suggested that "a system should be created
whereby a chronological waiting list is maintained, thereby affording
the applicants an opportunity to gauge the progress of their cases as
well as allowing both initial and renewed applications credit for time
passed."116
 While each of these cases deals with waiting list problems,
none requires the unveiling of such lists to eligible applicants. Clearly,
such information may be of great value to the applicant.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Dis-
orders stated in 1968 that, "Noday, after more than three decades of
fragmented and grossly underfunded federal housing programs, decent
housing remains a chronic problem for the disadvantaged urban
household." 117
 A major reason for this situation is, no doubt, an in-
sufficient amount of housing in this country. Persons eligible to
enter low-rent public housing may wait anywhere from six months
to three years for a vacancy to occur. A massive dose of new low-rent
housing is clearly needed. But until such time as this housing is
available, applicants for public housing will have to deal with the
reality. that housing authorities may act, if they desire, as benevolent
despots.
As has been demonstrated, the problem concerning admission to
low-rent public housing encompasses considerably more than a short-
age of housing units. Given the weaknesses inherent in the admission
regulations and the ambiguities that pervade the case law in this area,
an applicant—even one with legal counsel—can never be certain that
his application is being processed in accordance with statutory or
constitutional requirements. Reform is urgently needed. It would be
overly optimistic, however, to expect the various administrative agen-
cies to provide the necessary impetus. The courts must bear this
burden—and rightfully so—since the questions involved are, in the final
analysis, constitutional in nature.
116
 Id. at 139.
1" Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders 467 (1968).
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